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Can lab experiments on student populations serve to identify the motivational forces present 
in society at large? We address this question by conducting, to our knowledge, the first study 
of social preferences that brings a nationally representative population into the lab, and we 
compare their behavior to the behavior of different student populations. Our study shows that 
students may not be informative of the role of social preferences in the broader population. 
We find that the representative participants differ fundamentally from students both in their 
level of selfishness and in the relative importance assigned to different moral motives. It is 
also interesting to note that while we do not find any substantial gender differences among the 
students, males and females in the representative group differ fundamentally in their moral 
motivation. 
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Michelsen’s Gift To The Nation Fund. The classical approach to the study of social preferences in economics has been to conduct
experiments on students in the lab. Among the papers published on social preferences in
the top ve economics journals from 2000 to 2010, only four out of 24 papers reported
from experiments on non-student populations, and only two of the papers reported from
experiments done outside the lab.1 The focus on students may not necessarily be a
weakness of this research approach, in fact it has been argued that students often are
the perfect starting point for studying social preferences (G achter, 2010). Students are
typically cognitively sophisticated and they therefore rather easily grasp the nature of
distributive decision problems, which reduces noise and enables the researchers to identify
the underlying preference structure generating the observed choice patterns.
Still, there has been a growing interest in the generality of the ndings on students
(Falk and Heckman, 2009; Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan, 2010). Prominently, Henrich,
Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Ginties, and McElreath (2001), reporting from an economic
experiments on 15 small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural
conditions, show that social preferences matter for subject pools very dierent from the
standard student groups, and more recent papers have investigated the role of social
preferences in other non-student groups (Bellemare, Kr oger, and van Soest (2008); Belot,
Miller, and Duch (2010); Fehr and List (2004), among others). None of these studies,
however, have looked at whether students can serve to identify the motivational forces
present in society at large, which typically would be what economists are interested in
when studying markets and political institutions. The prevalence of social preferences
may fundamentally change the working of markets (Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger,
Riedel, and Sobel, 2011) and the outcome of political processes (Alesina and Angeletos,
2005), and thus it is of great importance to understand their role in the general population.
We report from an experiment that compares the lab behavior of students and a na-
tionally representative adult population.2 To our knowledge, this is the rst study of
social preferences that brings a nationally representative adult population into the lab,
and we believe that such an endeavor is important for gaining further understanding
of the extent to which ndings from lab experiments on students also apply more gen-
erally to the population at large. The fact that both groups take part in exactly the
same lab experiment enables us to compare the behavior of students and a representa-
tive population in identical choice environments where they face same level of scrutiny
and monitoring (Levitt and List, 2007), which makes observed dierences in behavior
informative of dierences in underlying social preferences.
We also investigate the role of dierent student populations in lab experiments. Eight
1The calculations are based on all issues of American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of
Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Review of Economic Studies in the period
2000-2010; see the appendix for a list of the 23 papers.
2Falk, Meier, and Zehnder (2011) presents an interesting related analysis, which compares the behavior
of students and a sample from the general population in a trust game conducted via mail correspondence.
2of the 24 papers published in the top ve economics journals from 2000 to 2010 reported
from experiments on students in economics, whereas nine papers relied on other student
groups or did not report detailed background information on the students. As highlighted
by the debate between Engelmann and Strobel (2004, 2006) and Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt
(2006), the choice of student sample may matter fundamentally in the study of social
preferences. In particular, Fehr et al. (2006) report results suggesting that the eciency
motive is especially salient among students of economics, who have been trained in the
idea that eciency is desirable, whereas equality appears to be of major importance for
non-economists (ranging, in their study, from students of various other disciplines to low-
level employees of banks and nancial institutions).3 We complement this debate by also
investigating whether students in economics or students in other disciplines are closer to
the behavior of a representative population in society.
Social preferences may dier fundamentally across economic environments. Fehr et al.
(2006) argue that equality is more important in strategic games than in non-strategic
games, but underline that better understanding of the functioning of dierent motiva-
tional forces in dierent environments is needed. The present study contributes to this
by comparing the behavior of dierent groups of students and a nationally representative
population both in a dictator game (a non-strategic environment) and in a generalized
trust game (a strategic environment), where we focus on the relative importance of equal-
ity, eciency and reciprocity in motivating the participants' behavior.4
Our study shows that the representative group diers fundamentally from the students
both in their level of selshness and in the relative importance assigned to dierent moral
motives. First, the representative group gives away 52% more than the student group in
the dictator game and returns 43% more in the trust game. Second, in the trust game,
we nd that the eciency motive is stronger among representative males than among
students, whereas representative females do not assign importance to eciency. Third,
the concern for equality expressed in the dictator game carries over to the return decision
in the trust game for representative males and students. Among representative females,
however, reciprocity concerns crowd out a concern for equality in a strategic environment.
The comparison of the student group and the representative group also illustrates
the potential danger of studying gender dierences in society at large on the basis of
a selected group such as students. In our student group, males and females assign the
same relative importance to the dierent moral motives, whereas males and females in
the representative group dier fundamentally in their moral motivation. Finally, we show
3See also Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2009) for a study of how training in economics may aect
the concern for eciency.
4The relative importance of dierent moral motives have been studied in a number of related exper-
iments, see among others Andreoni and Miller (2002); Charness and Rabin (2002); Cappelen, Drange
Hole, Srensen, and Tungodden (2007); Cappelen, Moene, Srensen, and Tungodden (forthcoming);
Engelmann and Strobel (2004); Fehr et al. (2006); Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007); Konow (2000).
3that students in economics and students in other disciplines mainly dier in their level
of selshness, where non-economics students are less selsh than students in economics
and thus make choices more in line with what we observe in the representative group.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the sampling procedure; section
2 provides details on the experimental design; section 3 and section 4 report results from
the dictator game and the trust game, respectively; section 5 concludes.
1 Samples and participants
Of the 375 participants in our study, 120 were students at the Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration (NHH) and 119 were students of subjects in the
humanities, natural sciences, and social sciences (other than economics) at the University
of Oslo (UiO). The gender distribution among the participating students is in line with
the gender distribution in the student samples that we recruited from. The remaining 136
participants were recruited from a representative sample of the Norwegian population.
Two criteria determined the selection of the non-student sample. First, we wanted this
sample to be representative of the Norwegian population with respect to age, gender,
employment and income. Second, as we wanted all participants in our study to participate
in a lab experiment at NHH, we considered it important that non-student participants
did not have to travel too far. Based on data from Statistics Norway, we established that
the population living in the 27 basic statistical units closest to NHH is representative for
the population in Norway with respect to the selected dimensions.5 This region includes
parts of the second largest city in Norway as well as less populated rural farming areas.
Following the approval of the experiment by both the Norwegian Social Science Data
Services (\Norsk samfunnsvitenskaplig datatjeneste") and the Norwegian Public Register
(\Norsk Folkeregister"), EDB Infobank drew a random subset of 1000 persons from our
representative population. We then randomly selected 460 individuals from this subset
to be invited to take part in the experiment. Each individual received a personal letter
inviting them to participate in a research project involving economic choices, but they
were not informed about the details or the purpose of the experiment. The letter also
gave the date and time of the session to which they had been assigned.6 The response rate
is similar across the three subject groups: for the representative group the response rate
5A basic statistical unit is the smallest geographical unit used by Statistics Norway.
6In the invitation they were told that they would receive 300 NOK (45 USD) in participation compen-
sation for an experiment that would last for about one hour, and that they could earn more during the
experiment. The student subjects received a similar invitation by email and were told that they would
receive 100 NOK in participation compensation. The dierence in participation compensation was based
on the additional travel time and cost that people in the representative population would incur relative
to the students in order to participate. Student sessions where held during the day, and representative
sessions in the evening.
4was 30.2%, for the NHH student group 28.6%, and for the UiO student group 26.2%.7
Table 1 reports the characteristics of the non-student group relative to the represen-
tative sample and the Norwegian population at large. The data for Norway and the
sample population were collected from Statistics Norway. The participants self-reported
age, gender, and employment, but not income.8 We collected the income data for the
participants from a publicly available tax return database. Since the participants were
anonymous in the experiment, we cannot link income data and experimental data at the
individual level. We observe that the non-student group is fairly representative in terms
of employment, gender, income, and age, with females being slightly overrepresented.
Hence, even though the non-student group may not be fully representative relative to
other characteristics, we retain the label representative in describing these participants.
2 Design
All interaction between the participants was anonymous and through a web-interface
developed for the experiment.9 In the rst part of the experiment, the participants
played standard dictator games. Each participant was involved in four dictator games,
two as dictator and two as passive recipient, each time randomly paired with another
participant in the same session. The endowment e in each game was either 500 NOK
or 1000 NOK. The dictator was asked to choose an amount y for the other person and
(e   y) for himself. The choice set of the dictator was limited to amounts divisible by
25 NOK. The participants were not informed about the outcome in the situations where
they were recipients until the end of the experiment.
In the second part of the experiment, the participants completed ten trust games, ve
as sender and ve as responder, each time randomly paired with another participant in
the same session. In each trust game, both the sender and the responder were allocated
an endowment ei 2 f100;200;300g, for i = 1;2, where the sum of the endowments for
each pair of players was always 400 NOK. In addition, there was a multiplier of m1 on
the sent amount and a multiplier m2 on the returned amount, where mi 2 f1;2;4g, for
i = 1;2, and the product of the two multipliers in each situation was 4.
All participants rst completed their decisions as senders. In each situation, before
they made a decision, they were informed about the vector (e1;e2;m1;m2), and the sender
then decided whether to send an amount y1  e1 of the endowment to the responder. The
710 of the invitations to the representative subset were returned to the research group because of wrong
address. The response rate was thus 136 out of 450. The total number of second year NHH students was
420, of which 120 participated in our study. At UiO, we invited students in seven particular bachelor-
level courses across the academic disciplines: The humanities (history; art studies), the natural sciences
(mathematics; biology; physics), and the social sciences (social anthropology; political science). The
total student pool at UIO consisted of 454 students, of which 119 participated in our study.
8Two students did not report gender and thus are excluded from the analysis
9Instructions were given in Norwegian. See the appendix for an English translation of the instructions.
5responder would then receive y2 = m1y1. After completing all ve sender decisions, each
participant was presented with an overview of their choices and given the opportunity
to revise each of them. All participants then completed their decisions as responders.
In each situation, the responder was informed about the vector (e1;e2;m1;m2;y1;y2),
and the responder then decided the amount y3  e2 + y2 to return to the sender. The
sender received y4 = m2y3. When the responders had completed their decisions in all
the ve situations, they were presented with an overview of their choices and given the
opportunity to revise each of them. The total payo for the sender (1) and the responder
(2) in a particular game is given by:
1 = e1   y1 + m2y3 = e1   y1 + y4;
2 = e2 + m1y1   y3 = e2 + y2   y3:
The choice set of both players was limited to amounts divisible by 25 NOK.
At the end of the experiment, for each person and with equal probability, one of the
games in which the participant had been involved was randomly drawn to determine
actual payment. The nal payment procedure ensured that neither the participants nor
the research team were in a position to identify how much each participant earned in the
experiment.
3 The dictator game
The distributive situation in the dictator game has three important characteristics that
limit the possible motives the dictator may have for sharing. First, the other participant
is unable to respond to the decision made by the dictator, which implies that sharing
cannot be motivated by self-interest. Second, the total income is xed, which implies
that sharing cannot be motivated by eciency concerns. Third, the dictator does not
respond to a decision made by the other participant, which implies that sharing cannot
be motivated by reciprocal concerns.
We interpret the amount given as a measure of the extent to which a concern for
equality motivates the dictator to act non-selshly.10 Figure 1 provides a histogram of
the share given for the subject groups by gender, the average share given is reported in
Table 2. We observe from the upper part of the gure that there are large dierences
between students and representatives. Whereas the mode among students is to take ev-
erything for themselves, the mode among representatives is to share equally. On average,
representative males give away almost twice as much as student males (40.3% versus
22.6%, p < 0:001), and representative females give away 30% more than student females
10There are only small dierences in share given for 500 NOK and 1000 NOK; 27.9% versus 26.2% for
students, 41.1% versus 41.3% for representatives.
6(41.7% versus 32.2%, p < 0:001).11 The representative group is therefore clearly less
selsh than the students. As shown in Table 3, age and employment are not statistically
important in explaining the behavior of the representative group.
The lower part of Figure 1 compares the two dierent student groups, where we
observe that a larger share of economics students take everything for themselves, both
among males and among females. Table 2 and Table 3 show that this pattern also
holds for average share given away, economic students are on average more selsh than
non-economics students (19.8% versus 26.2% for males, p = 0:072; 26.9% versus 36.2%
for females, p = 0:005). The behavior of non-economics students is thus closer to the
behavior of the representative group, even though the non-economics students also give
away less than the representative group (p < 0:001 for males, p =0.036 for females).
Furthermore, we observe that there are statistically signicant gender dierences in
average share given away in both student groups (19.8% versus 26.9% for economics
students, p = 0:035; 26.2% versus 36.4% for non-economics students, p = 0:004), but
not in the representative group (40.2% versus 41.7%, p = 0:608).12 This illustrates the
danger of studying gender dierences in society at large on the basis of a very selected
subject group, such as students.
To summarize, the dictator game provides clear evidence of non-selsh behavior in
the representative group, and shows that the great importance of equality may be under-
estimated if we focus on student groups. The behavior of the non-economics students is
closer to the behavior of the representative group, but in both student groups we nd a
signicant gender dierence that is not present in the representative group.
4 The trust game
We now turn to a study of the behavior in the trust game, where the participants poten-
tially may be motivated by eciency, equality and reciprocity considerations.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide histograms for share sent and returned for both subject
groups by gender, the average shares are reported in Table 2. We observe that share sent is
almost the same for the representative group and the student group (51.7% versus 54.1%),
but with some gender dierences. The mode among student males is to send everything
and on average they send more than representative males, whereas representative females
on average send less than student females. In both cases, however, we observe large stan-
dard errors and the dierences between students and representatives are not statistically
signicant (p = 0:100 for males and p = 0:188 for females). Comparing the two student
11In all tests reported in the paper, we have corrected for repeated sampling of individuals using a
clustered sandwich estimator of the standard errors.
12The same pattern holds if we consider the share of participants taking everything for themselves.
There is a statistically signicant dierence between males and females among students (36.4% versus
17.7%, p = 0:013), but not among representatives (5.0% versus 3.0%, p = 0:517).
7groups, we observe that the economics students and non-economics students are equally
trusting in their behavior, we do not observe any statistically signicant dierences in
share sent (62.0% versus 62.0% for males, p = 0:993; 42.9% versus 47.2% for females,
p = 0:399). We do, however, again observe a statistically signicant gender dierences in
average share sent in both student groups (62.0% versus 42.9% for economics students,
p = 0:001; 62.0% versus 47.2% for non-economics students, p = 0:003), but not in the
representative group (54.2% versus 50.2%, p = 0:390).
In the return decision, we observe a huge dierence in behavior between male students
and male representatives. Male students return on average a much lower share (19.7%
versus 36.5%, p < 0:001), and the share of male students returning nothing is three
times that of representative males (32.3% versus 11.0%, p < 0:001;). In contrast, we
do not observe a statistically signicant dierence between female students and female
representatives in average share returned (22.5% versus 25.9%, p = 0:117). This is due
to female non-economics students returning slightly more than female representatives,
and also signicantly more than all the other student groups. If we consider the share
of females returning nothing, however, we nd the same dierence between students and
the representative group as among males (17.9% versus 5.8%, p < 0:001).
In comparing the two student groups, we only observe a statistically signicant dif-
ference in share returned among females, where female economics students return less
than female non-economics students (16.1% versus 27.4%, p < 0:001). In fact, the share
of female economics students returning nothing is close to the share of male economics
students returning nothing (27.5% versus 35.4%, p=0.184), and signicantly higher than
among female non-economics students (27.5% versus 10.4%, p <0.001).
Both the send decision and return decision may be inuenced by self-interest consid-
erations and moral considerations, but the return decision provides the most direct test
of how the participants trade o selshness and dierent moral motivations in a strate-
gic environment. The eciency motive comes into play through the multiplier on the
returned amount, which varies from 1 to 4. When the multiplier is 1, there is no e-
ciency argument for returning anything, whereas a multiplier of 2 or 4 provides a strong
eciency argument for returning everything. The reciprocity motive comes into play
because the responder may want to reward participants who have sent a large share of
the endowment. Both these motives, however, may interact with the concern for equality
in the return decision; the equality motive may dampen the willingness to act on the
eciency motive, and it may generate reciprocal behavior independent of the reciprocity
motive.
To capture the extent to which a concern for equality motivates the return decision,
we calculate the amount, y
target
3 , that each participant has to return to achieve the distri-
bution he or she selected as dictator.13 We do so by rst solving the following equation






(e1   y1 + m2y
3)
(e1   y1 + m2y




where sdictator is the share given to the other person in the dictator game.14 The return






In the following, we use y
target
3 to control for the importance of the equality motive in the
return decision.
Table 4 reports regressions of share returned by gender on the three other-regarding
motives, reciprocity (share sent), equality (share returned target), and eciency (mul-
tiplier return). We observe some striking dierences between males and females in the
representative group. Representative males assign great importance to eciency con-
cerns, the point estimate of the multiplier is 9.2% and thus the estimated dierence in
share returned between situations with a multiplier of 1 and 4 is 27.6%, whereas the
share returned among representative females is not at all sensitive to the multiplier.15
Representative females exhibit a strong reciprocal motivation in the return decision, but
not a concern for equality as expressed in the non-strategic environment.16 In contrast,
the reciprocal motive does not seem to have any force among representative males, who
also in the strategic environment assign importance to equality considerations.
A very dierent picture emerges for the student group. First, students assign far less
importance to eciency than representative males, but much more importance to equality
than female representatives. Second, the reciprocity motive has some motivational force
among the students, but is less prominent than among female representatives. Third,
there are no statistically signicant gender dierences in the student group, which is in
stark contrast to what we nd in the representative group. In sum, the trust game shows
that the social preferences of representatives and students group are very dierent.
If we now compare the student groups, we observe that the estimates are strikingly
similar. Both among economics students and non-economics students, the equality motive
is highly signicant. Eciency, on the other hand, plays a minor role for all student
14In calculating sdictator, we take, for each participant, the average share given in the dictator game.
15It is interesting to compare this nding to Alm as, Cappelen, Srensen, and Tungodden (2010), who
report results from a social preference lab experiment done on a group of children from 5th grade to
13th grade that is fairly representative for these age groups in Norway. They nd that a concern for
eciency mainly develops among males throughout adolescence, which maps closely to the male-specic
focus on eciency in the representative group. Martinsson, Nordblom, R utzler, and Sutter (2011) also
report a similar gender dierence in concern for eciency in a study of social preferences among children
in Sweden and Austria.
16This is in line with the nding in Croson and Gneezy (2009) that the social preferences of females
are more situationally specic than those of men.
9groups, and it is only statistically signicant for male economics students. The reciprocity
motive also seem to play a similar role in all student groups, even though it is not
statistically signicant for male non-economics students. Overall, the small dierences
between the student groups suggest that they assign the same relative importance to the
dierent moral motives.
5 Conclusion
Our study demonstrates clearly that student subject groups may not be representative
of the social preferences in society at large. They dier fundamentally from a representa-
tive group of non-students both in their level of selshness and in the relative importance
assigned to dierent moral motives. Moreover, we show that while there are few signif-
icant gender dierences in the student groups, males and females in the representative
group dier fundamentally in their moral motivation. Finally, we observe that economics
students and non-economics students dier in their level of selshness, but not in the
relative importance assigned to dierent moral motives.
We nd that both equality and eciency are important motivational forces among
representative males, whereas representative females seem to move from a concern for
equality in non-strategic environments to a focus on reciprocity in economic environments.
The fact that all three motives play a role in explaining lab behavior of a group that is
representative for the Norwegian population suggests that these motives are important
also when analyzing economic and social phenomena in society at large.
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Notes: The gure reports, for each subgroup, the distribution of the share given in the dictator
game. Each participant acts as the dictator in two dictator game situations, and each dictator
game situation enters here as an independent observation.





















































































































































































Notes: The gure reports, for each subgroup, the distribution of the share sent in the trust
game. Each participant acts as the sender in ve trust game situations, and each trust game
situation enters here as an independent observation.





















































































































































































Notes: The gure reports, for each subgroup, the distribution of the share returned in the trust
game. Each participant acts as the responder in ve trust game situations, and each trust game
situation enters here as an independent observation.
15Table 1: Age, gender, employment and income distributions for the non-student group,
the sample population, and the Norwegian population
Non-student group Sample Norway
population
A. Age
17-30 25.6 26.8 25.5
31-40 14.3 23.7 22.3
41-50 30.1 19.2 20.6
51-60 16.5 16.5 19.1
61-70 13.5 13.8 12.5
B. Gender
Male 38.6 48.4 49.6
Female 61.4 51.6 50.4
C. Employment
Private sector 55.6 58.1 63.8
Public sector 44.4 41.9 36.2
D. Income
0-99,999 20.9 23.5 24.7
100,000-199,999 24.8 25.7 29.8
200,000-299,999 27.1 24.2 24.8
300,000-399,999 15.5 11.6 10.7
400,000-499,999 6.2 5.8 4.1
500,000 and over 5.4 9.3 5.8
Notes: Non-student group: Age, gender, and employment are self-reported by the partici-
pants in the experiment. Income is taxable income in NOK, including labor income and capital
gains over the year, net of all deductables including interest payments; collected from publicly
available tax return database (Year: 2005). Sample population and Norway: Age and gen-
der are collected from Statistics Norway (Year: 2006). Employment is collected from Statistics
Norway (Year: 2001). Income is collected from Statistics Norway (Year: 2004).
16Table 2: Share given in the dictator game, share sent and share returned in the trust
game
Students, Econ. Students, non-Econ. All students Representative
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
A. Share given, dictator game
Mean 0.198 0.269 0.262 0.364 0.226 0.322 0.403 0.417
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.012)
B. Share sent, trust game
Mean 0.620 0.429 0.620 0.472 0.620 0.453 0.542 0.502
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.038) (0.027)
C. Share returned, trust game
Mean 0.186 0.161 0.210 0.274 0.197 0.225 0.365 0.259
(0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.037) (0.016)
n 70 48 57 62 127 110 52 84
Notes: The table reports, for each subgroup, the average share given in the dictator game,
average share sent in the trust game, and average share returned in the trust game (n is the
number of individuals in each subgroup). Each individual acts as dictator in two dictator games,
as sender in ve trust games, and as responder in ve trust games. Standard errors corrected
for clustering on individuals in parentheses.
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